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991.
Punishment,counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We present the results of an experiment that explores the sanctioning behavior of individuals who experience a social dilemma.
In the game we study, players choose contribution levels to a public good and subsequently have multiple opportunities to
reduce the earnings of the other members of the group. The treatments vary in terms of individuals’ opportunities to (a) avenge
sanctions that have been directed toward themselves, and (b) punish others’ sanctioning behavior with respect to third parties.
We find that individuals do avenge sanctions they have received, and this serves to decrease contribution levels. They also
punish those who fail to sanction third parties, but the resulting increase in contributions is smaller than the decrease
the avenging of sanctions induces. When there are five rounds of unrestricted sanctioning, contributions and welfare are significantly
lower than when only one round of sanctioning opportunities exists, and welfare is lower than at a benchmark of zero cooperation.
We thank James Andreoni, participants in seminars at Emory University, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the University
of New South Wales, the University of Sydney, Deakin University, the 2004 North American Regional Meetings of the ESA in Tucson,
Arizona, USA, the 2004 IMEBE Meetings in Cordoba, Spain, and the 2005 SAET meetings in Vigo, Spain, for constructive and helpful
comments. We thank Elven Priour for programming and organization of the sessions. Instructions for the experiment are available
from the authors. 相似文献
992.
Hans Schenk 《Empirica》1996,23(3):255-278
This paper suggests that while the static welfare losses of merger predilections among Western firms may not be dramatic, they may lead to substantial dynamic losses when merger-prone firms need to compete with firms which instead focus on equipment investment and investments in R&D. It is suggested that such diverging investment priorities have been the real cause of the deteriorating competitiveness of many of the largest Western enterprises vis-à-vis their Japanese rivals. While mergers are generally taken to be determined by either efficiency or monopoly considerations, this paper argues that Western merger predilections are likely to be generated by a combination of imitative and defensive routines as well. That would make it difficult for firms to unilaterally break away from these competitiveness-threatening investments. If correct, this would imply that competition policies would need to be refocused. However, it is also suggested that the implications for international competitiveness should make merger questions a subject of industrial policies too. In that respect, the paper suggests some basic attitudinal changes.Earlier versions of this paper were presented at a Global Forum for Competition and Trade Policy conference in Vienna and at a EUNIP workshop at Åbo Akademi University, Finland. Financial support from the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs (contract nos. 54473 and 57305) and the European Commission (contract no. ERB CHRX CT94-0454), research assistance from Michel Renirie and Chee-Wai Chan, and helpful comments from the conference and workshop participants, especially Kurt Bayer and Keith Cowling, are gratefully acknowledged. Only the author is responsible for the contents of, and any flaws in the paper. 相似文献
993.
Summary. This paper considers a dynamic version of Akerlof's (1970) lemons problem where buyers and sellers must engage in search
to find a trading partner. We show that if goods are durable, the market itself may provide a natural sorting mechanism. In
equilibrium, high-quality goods sell at a higher price than low-quality goods but also circulate longer. This accords with
the common wisdom that sellers who want to sell fast may have to accept a lower price. We then compare the equilibrium outcomes
under private information with those under complete information. Surprisingly, we find that for a large range of parameter
values the quilibrium outcomes under the two information regimes coincide, despite the fact that circulation time is used
to achieve separation.
Received: August 24, 2000; revised version: October 24, 2000 相似文献
994.
Janusz A. Holyst Tilo Hagel Günter Haag Wolfgang Weidlich 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》1996,6(1):31-42
An economic system which exhibits chaotic behaviour has been stabilized on various periodic orbits by use of the Ott-Grebogi-Yorke method. This procedure has been recently applied to controlling chaotic phenomena in physical, chemical and biological systems. We adopt this method successfully for Feichtinger's generic model of two competing firms with asymmetrical investment strategies. We show that the application of this control method to the particular economic process considered brings a substantial advantage: one can easily switch from a chaotic trajectory to a regular periodic orbit and simultaneously improve the system's economic properties. Numerical simulations are presented in order to illustrate the effectiveness of the whole procedure.The work was supported by the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung and by the Polish National Council (KBN) Grant No 2 P302 038 04. 相似文献
995.
Protecting human health is a primary goal of environmental policy and economic evaluation of health can help policy-makers judge the relative worth of alternative actions. Economists use two distinct approaches in normatively evaluating health. Whereas environmental economists use benefit-cost analysis supported by monetary valuation in terms of willingness-to-pay, health economists evaluate interventions based on cost-effectiveness or cost-utility analysis (CEA), using quality-adjusted life-years (QALY) or similar indexes. This paper provides background on the controversy about the relative merits of these approaches and introduces the remaining papers in the special issue. These papers (with one exception) were presented at a conference sponsored by the Department of Economics at the University of Central Florida with support from the US Environmental Protection Agency. Although CEA might not lead to substantially different implications for environmental policy than benefit-cost analysis, and QALY may provide a benefit transfer tool to fill gaps in the morbidity valuation literature, the papers in this issue raise serious concerns about the suitability of QALY-based CEA for environmental regulatory analysis. QALY does not in general appropriately represent individual preferences for health and CEA is neither independent of income distribution nor adequate to assess efficiency. 相似文献
996.
基于DEA方法的高校办学效益评价指标体系研究 总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5
介绍了建立DEA模型输入输出指标体系的原则,在对高校投入产出进行全面分析的基础上,对高校办学效益DEA评价指标体系进行了探讨. 相似文献
997.
本文分析了我国农村存在的环境问题,从经济学角度分析了农村环境问题产生的原因,并提出了农村环境问题的治理措施与途径:消除其公共物品性和外部性。 相似文献
998.
Maroš Servátka 《Experimental Economics》2007,10(2):199-200
The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration.
The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment
places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: in
one treatment the paired player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has information on the paired player’s
reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictators’ behavior towards a stranger is
not statistically significantly different from their behavior towards an individual with an established reputation. The findings
arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. The data also provides
evidence that dictators are more generous when they know that their choices (but not their identities) will be revealed in
the future. In the second experiment the dictators’ choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment
the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation.
The second essay explores the ways in which information about others’ actions affects one’s own behavior in a dictator game.
The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient’s within-game reputation on
the dictator’s decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of
motives helps to identify the mechanisms of social transmission of impulses towards selfish or generous behavior. The data
analysis reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than social influence and identification.
In the third essay1 we examine the reputation effects in a labor market setting by analyzing the influence of negative technological shocks on
long run relationships between firms and workers. The positive correlation between wage and effort in static conditions has
been demonstrated in many experimental studies and has been one of the prominent explanations for the existence of wage rigidity.
We subject these findings to further tests in a non-stationary environment that better corresponds to outside-the-lab market
conditions. We observe the positive correlation of wages and effort but do not find support for downward wage rigidity in
our data. Once the shocks occur, firms lower the wages and relationships often break down. The workers who accept a lower
wage respond with exerting a lower effort.
JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64
1Co-authored with Ninghua Du.
Dissertation Committee:
Dissertation Advisor: James C. Cox
Martin Dufwenberg,
Price V. Fishback,
Ronald L. Oaxaca 相似文献
999.
本文主要阐述了反倾销中的反规避行为,通过比较欧美立法,提出对我国立法具有参考性的建设性意见,强调了我国反规避立法的迫切性与必要性。 相似文献
1000.